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Uses and abuses of AGE models
This is a topic where we have all had our own experiences. My experience has been in a government
agency, in the Australian Industry Commission. Some of you of course work in other government
agencies, and your experiences may have been like mine in some ways, and in other ways different.
Many are in academia, and your experience may be quite different. But you may still find this has
some interest, as an account of how the other half live.
In talking about abuses of AGE models for obvious reasons I won't be mentioning any names; but
let me just say that the people involved in those exercises are very competent people, very
experienced in AGE modeling, and people for whom I have a lot of professional respect. So these
abuses are significant observations: they don't just prove the general point that any technology can
be misused by incompetents.
Thinking about this topic, I thought something like this. AGE modeling is much of the time a long
and lonely business. We spend months, or in some cases years, putting a database together, and then
we spend a long time debugging the programs and experiments; and sometimes we need to raise our
heads from the keyboard, and look at the long-run goals that make it all worthwhile. And sometimes
when we do this we realize that it's not worthwhile: that we've been spending our lives in producing
trash. Or that what we're doing isn't going to make any difference. And this seems kind of sad, for
people who only live once. So it seems worthwhile to raise our heads from the keyboard a little
earlier, to avoid these unrewarding outcomes, and try and get some better outcomes.
In this topic of 'Uses and Abuses, I will first talk about some examples of abuses of AGE models,
then about some uses, and then to talk about some dubious uses; where by dubious uses I mean
applications that seem to achieve something worthwhile but at the same time are somehow not fully
professionally rewarding. Finally I will talk about some practices that seem to have worked in
conducing to rewarding outcomes, and avoiding unrewarding outcomes.
Many of you as experienced modelers are well aware that a prime field for model abuse is in
choosing parameter settings and closures. But while this may be familiar, I think it's worthwhile to
tell one horror story, involving most of the kinds of abuse that can be practiced in this area of
tendentious parameter settings and closures. It is a substantial question what we mean by
'substantial', in a field where there can be wide legitimate differences of opinion on many matters.
We're going to model trade liberalization, so our starting point is that trade liberalization is a good
thing, and since it's a good thing we know it must have substantial welfare benefits. So we come to
consider our trade elasticities, and we know that the Whalley school favors low elasticities, and the
IMPACT camp favors high elasticities, and with a little bit of insight we can see that the elasticities
should be a bit higher than even the IMPACT camp favor. And we know that elasticities are lower
over the short run and higher over the long run, so we have the insight that the right time frame for
choosing the elasticities is long run.
And the next thing we need to consider is the closure. And here we know that in the standard long-
run closure, with fixed endowments of labor, capital, and land, nothing much is likely to happen to
aggregate production; and with nothing much happening to production, we're not likely to get any
large welfare gains. But we also know that in many short-run closures, labor employment is
endogenous, with real wages fixed, and in these closures we can get big increases in production. So
our second major insight is that the right time frame for the closure is short run.
Now with this closure, we're going to get increases in production by lowering tariffs, so that
consumer prices fall and these feed into lower [money] wages and these make it more worthwhile
for firms to employ more labor. But these tariff cuts are going to have a fiscal impact, and if we
offset this with tax increases in other areas we may undo the beneficial effects on wages of the tariff
cut. So our last major insight is that we'd better not have well specified government fiscal accounts
in the model.
Now it's worth at this point taking a closer look at how we are going to get welfare benefits out of
this model. We are going to model trade liberalization mainly through tariff reductions, and these
tariff reductions are indirect tax cuts that are going to lower consumer prices relative to producers'
output prices. So with wage rates linked to the consumer price index, we are going to reduce own-
product real wage rates; and this will increase the incentives for firms to hire more workers. But it's
clear at this point that the welfare gains we get will have nothing to do with gains from trade; they
are gains from applying a relaxation in fiscal policy to bribe workers to accept lower own-product
wage rates. With tariffs as the main instrument of industry assistance, we get fiscal stimulus along
with trade liberalization; but clearly with other forms of assistance we could get the opposite
combination. For example, if the coal industry in the EC receives assistance in the form of output
subsidies, then removing this assistance will promote trade in coal, but at the same time it will
represent a fiscal tightening with adverse welfare effects. So with different assistance instruments
we can reverse the appearance of gains from trade.
This does not matter much in a one-application model. We've got the results we need for the job at
hand; there may be some problem about what time frame they apply to, but we can handle that with
good drafting. But at this point we can begin to see what it can mean to describe parameter settings
and closures as tendentious. These are settings we can live with only for the job at hand; if a
different job for the same model comes along, we're going to have to reverse many of these
decisions, for reasons that have nothing to do with our view of the world. So it seems reasonable to
describe these settings as tendentious.
Now this work was not done in the Industry Commission, but by a small outside group, and I think
it illustrates one merit of policy analysis in government agencies. Bureaucrats are criticized rightly
for many things, but they do typically have to maintain some continuity and consistency in approach.
So it's not so easy for a government agency to make tendentious choices for one application and then
walk away from them and make the opposite choices for the next application.
Another unfavorable outcome that happens frequently is that the model is fine, and the simulation
is fine, but the analysis is trash. Some of you may have seen the popular psychology books by a
neurophysiologist named Sachs. One topic discussed in these books is conditions involving massive
selective memory loss. These conditions involve loss of short-term memory, so that the victim has
normal memory of his life up to the onset of the disease, but no later memory. And in some of these
conditions – and these are serious and sad conditions – the victim is unaware of his loss of memory.
If you ask one of these people what he did last night, he will give you a coherent and normal-
sounding answer, but one unrelated to fact. His answer is made up on the spot, and he doesn't realize
that he is just making it up. If you ask him about his home and his family, he will give you some
reasonable-sounding reply; and if you ask him tomorrow, he won't recognize you, but he will give
you another reasonable-sounding reply, totally unrelated to what he said yesterday, and totally
unrelated to reality.
The technical term for this behavior is confabulation. A lot of confabulation goes on in simulation
analysis.
Preparing for this course I was looking at simulations that have been done in the growth and
development area, and among these I saw a paper about the effects on Australia of rapid growth in
some East Asian economies. According to the simulations in this paper, the effects on Australia of
rapid growth in East Asia were adverse. Now this is a rather unexpected result, and you would
naturally want to see a convincing explanation for it, and the paper does offer a reasonable-looking
explanation. The explanation is that growth in East Asia is associated with stronger investment
opportunities in East Asia, and capital flow into East Asia from other regions. One of these regions
is Australia; so growth in East Asia leads to a reduction in the Australian capital stock. Now the
government taxes capital, so the marginal social benefit of capital exceeds the marginal social
cost.So the reduction in capital in Australia is welfare-reducing for Australia.
Now this is a logical explanation, and sounds like something that might well happen in reality; but
it certainly does not happen in that model. In the model there are no taxes on foreign-owned capital.
So whatever is driving the Australian welfare losses, it does not seem to be the capital outflow. The
explanation that has been offered does not connect with what is happening in the model; it's a
confabulation. And this is common; quite a lot of simulation analysis is really confabulation.
Turning from abuses to uses, I suppose the reason why AGE modeling came into being in the first
place was to address problems that are too complex to work out in the head or on the back of an
envelope. And it does sometimes happen that an AGE study makes a contribution of exactly this
kind; not very often, in my own experience, but sometimes.
One example of this that I was involved in was in a study of tax concessions to owner occupiers. In
Australia, as in the United States and many other countries, the direct tax system treats ownership
of one's own home more favorable than other forms of investment. Working out the effects of
reducing these disparities is a complex problem: the home is both a capital asset and a consumer
durable, it's not clear how much the disparities switch capital between housing and other domestic
investments, how much they affect total domestic investment, how much they affect capital inflow
from abroad. Building a general equilibrium model seemed a sensible way of addressing these issues.
So we built a model for the study, or rather we extended the ORANI model, adding financial assets,
distinguishing between equity and loan capital and setting up inwards and outwards foreign
investment flows. And we got answers to the questions about investment reallocation and the rest
that we would not have been able to get by simpler methods, but also we got some insights that we
had not been looking for. The experience change my thinking at least about the importance of direct
taxes. We spend a lot of time looking at very moderate commodity taxes and assistance measures,
while there are massive disparities in capital taxation, and disparities involving some very sensitive
flows.It also made me realize that it does not really make sense to talk about something as simple
as the desirability or otherwise of encouraging capital inflow into Australia: the welfare effects of
an increase in net capital inflow will be completely different depending on whether it comes about
through equity investment from abroad, foreign lending, or reductions in Australian-owned assets
overseas.
So sometimes we use AGE models to get insights into complex problems; but in my experience, not
very often. More frequent is the situation where we use models to demonstrate what we knew all
along, or should have known all along. For instance we quite often seem to need to run AGE models
to demonstrate the application of the law of comparative advantage. We've all presumably come
across the idea somewhere along the line that trade patterns respond to not absolute but comparative
advantage, but we often seem to need to perform AGE simulations and defend them at length to
convince our colleagues, and perhaps ourselves, of the application of the law in particular
circumstances.
This brings us to the third part of the subject, dubious uses. By dubious uses I mean uses which seem
to achieve some worthwhile purpose, but which are in some way not fully professionally satisfying.
The Industry Commission has several times in recent years has published in its Annual Report AGE-
based estimates of the economic benefits of various microeconomic reforms. For example, one part
of a reform package might be an improvement in productive efficiency in the state electricity supply
authorities; and there might be efficiency improvements in transport, and so on.
Now we don't really need to run a general equilibrium model to work out that running things better
is likely to be a good idea. And we shouldn't really need the model to work out for us that if we can
find some way to reorganize production to stop wasting inputs of say five billion dollars a year, then
the economic benefits of the reorganization are likely to be somewhere about five billion dollars a
year.  Nevertheless these simulations do seem to serve some useful function. They draw attention
to some real economic costs and opportunities, and extracting the estimates from the model seems
to enhance their profile and credibility. So it seems that we're doing something useful: we are
running valid simulations, and getting a message across that is true and important. And the fact that
the simulations are in a sense trivial has at least this advantage, that we can be confident that we are
getting the answer right.
On the other hand this approach does have some problems. While we are convincing people of
something true, we seem to be convincing them for the wrong reason; they believe the model not
because they understand how it works, but because they don't understand it; the model derives its
authority in their eyes from being opaque and mysterious. And over the longer run this could lead
to trouble, if users become disillusioned and realize that their belief in the model had no rational
basis.
The other problem is with our own professional satisfaction. Even if the model is serving a useful
PR function, from a professional point of view the way to get better policy information on
productivity reform is not running it through a general equilibrium model, but getting better
estimates of the potential for productivity gains and on ways of achieving that potential.
So a range of outcomes is possible, ranging from highly rewarding to completely unrewarding, and
now I want to spend the time that is left discussing practices that lead to the more rewarding
outcomes. This part of the talk may be particularly institution-specific; it's based very much on my
experience in the IC, and it may not apply at all well say to working as an academic.
The first practice is not to define yourself as an AGE modeler. If you define yourself as a modeler,
then you are committed to addressing every issue as a modeling question, but some issues are just
not ripe for AGE modeling. To have a worthwhile model you need some worthwhile theory and
worthwhile data, and if these are not around you may be better off doing a theoretical study or a
descriptive study. So if you define yourself as an economist, you have the flexibility to do this. And
if you do a modeling study, once you've got the results you need to connect them up with the pre-
existing theory, and here again you need to define yourself as an economist and not just a model
jockey.
The second practice is to keep it simple. We usually overestimate when we begin a study how much
complexity we need in the model to get a worthwhile story out of it. And of course we always
underestimate the time and effort to get the complexity functioning.
Often very simple points can be the most important. Even if they're not intellectually challenging
they're often what policy makers most need to know, and they're often not obvious beforehand. In
the extreme, if data problems are getting in the way of developing the model, then there's likely to
be a market for a purely descriptive study. If the data problems are tough for you, they're tough for
everybody, and in that situation people find a lot of use and interest just looking t tables that give
them a feel for the size and shape of the sector under examination. Often the most read part of a
modelling write up can be a data appendix.
The general law is that the optimal level of complexity is always lower ex post. There's been no
mathematics in the talk so far, so this may be time to introduce some notation. Let C* denote the
optimal degree of complexity, and E[C*](t) the modeler's estimate of C* as held at time t. Then
E[C*](t) decreases monotonically over time; and it has a vertical asymptote, sometime slightly after
or slightly before the project deadline.
I've often felt, and often heard people say, 'I wish we'd tried something simpler.' I've never yet heard
anyone say, 'Gee, I wish we'd done something more complex.'
If you can provide a study that does justice to what your audience knows already about
the situation, and which also provides one clear insight that they didn't have already,
then you're likely to make a sale. Thank you.
The last practice that seems to conduce to rewarding outcomes is, wherever possible, to make your
business that of supplying analyses of economic issues, not just supplying model results. You can't
always do this, but when you can't, you do lose a lot of value from the simulation. Your client may
not understand your results, and she almost certainly doesn't understand the model as well as you
do, its limitations and the things it's useful for and the assumptions underlying it. And you miss out
doing the vital step, of relating the results back to the theory and the facts of the issue.
We do need to remember always that the job doesn't start when the final printout lands on the desk,
that's just when it starts. You're running the model because somebody needs some insights into some
problem, and the best job you can get is to supply him the best insights that the model, taken together
with the non-modelling background, can generate. This gets back to the previous point, about being
an economist not just a modeler.
